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Appropriate Fiscal Policy over the Business 





Fiscal policy has become quite controversial in the post-Keynesian era, the debate over the 
Obama stimulus package being a contentious recent example. Some pundits go so far as to 
take the position that macroeconomic theory has failed to meaningfully progress in terms of 
providing useful recommendations for policy-makers, particularly in times of recession. 
Others take the laissez-faire view that policy reactions to the business cycle do not help in a 
rational expectations world and indeed do harm by increasing uncertainty. Still others, while 
not necessarily viewing themselves as in any sense “Keynesian,” have a nagging feeling that 
sometimes doing nothing must be worse than doing something…but what to do? Sensible 
guidance is provided here on how governments should spend taxpayer dollars and on how that 
spending should change under varying economic conditions. The nature of public goods, 
namely whether they are complements, substitutes, or neutral to private goods, is seen to be 
critical to such decisions. 
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Many economists believe that the traditionally-defined Keynesian multiplier is essentially zero 
or perhaps in certain, relatively rare, cases perhaps slightly positive.  For example, Barro (2009) 
makes a number of seemingly reasonable arguments indicating that the government multiplier 
for wartime expenditures was less than 1.0 and that the multiplier for peacetime expenditures 
was ―statistically insignificantly different from zero.‖  This is, of course, what one would expect 
from even a cursory glance at the production possibilities frontier of microeconomic principles 
classes, if the economy is on or reasonably near that frontier.  
  If such assertions are valid, however, they cast great doubt on the impact of the Obama 
stimulus  package  on  the  economy.    Indeed,  if  the  stimulus  package  is  comprised  of  many 
projects that would fail a properly-conducted benefit-cost test, economic welfare could take a big 
hit–we do not want to take high value inputs, or at least potentially high value inputs, to create 
low value outputs.  Regardless of any stimulus to the economy, such projects are simply too 
wasteful.   
  Additionally, one might expect that greatly increased government spending, particularly 
when debt financed, is likely to cause rational individuals to behave in ways that would offset 
any stimulus that might have otherwise been forthcoming.  One would anticipate, and we are 
starting to observe, that rational individuals would increase savings rates in anticipation of higher 
future tax burdens associated with the financing of large deficits.  This would be true even 
holding status quo expectations about future interest rates.  If Treasury bond-holders become 
more nervous about rising debt/GDP ratios and cause interest rates to rise, this effect would be 
greatly exacerbated, further hindering any stimulus-related recovery.     What sort of stimulus, if any, is likely to work?  One can immediately reject government 
provision  of  useful  ordinary  private  goods–one  would  expect  private  demands  to  fall  in 
proportion to government provision, leaving no stimulus.  Additionally, the private sector is 
likely to be more efficient at providing private goods in any event.  We are left, then, with public 
goods...goods that would not be produced by the private sector.   
  But all public goods are not created equal.  Two types of public goods can be rejected for 
a stimulus package on efficiency arguments akin to those for private goods.  We would not want 
to produce entirely ―useless‖ public goods (e.g. pyramids, bridges to nowhere), although they 
might  provide  some  stimulus  in  a  sufficiently  high  unemployment  economy.  Such  projects 
would not  pass  any reasonable benefit-cost  test  and would waste society’s  scarce resources.  
  Additionally, it is unlikely that we would want to provide very much in the way of public 
goods that have powerful existing special interest groups (e.g. national defense, with Eisenhower 
first warning of the dangers of the military-industrial complex), because such goods are likely to 
already be well provided.  Again accurate benefit-cost analyses of such goods would be likely to 
reveal marginal benefits near or below marginal costs.   
  However, in Section II it is shown that provision of certain types of public goods is likely 
to result in peacetime fiscal multipliers substantially greater than zero, and potentially well in 
excess of 1.0.  When public goods are neither substitutes nor complements with private goods it 
is seen in this section that their provision affects the labor supply decisions for two, mutually 
reinforcing, reasons.  Section III examines cases in which public goods are either substitutes for 
private  goods  or  complements  with  private  goods.    It  is  seen  there  that  which  policies  are 
appropriate to proceed with will depend on the state of the economy.  Section IV summarizes the 
implications for appropriate fiscal policy over the business cycle.   II.   Public Goods and the Labor Supply Decision 
As  noted  by  Flores  and  Graves  (2008),  conventional  benefit-cost  analysis  of  public  goods 
provision aggregates individual willingness to pay while treating income as exogenous, ignoring 
the fact that we generate income to allow us to purchase utility-generating goods.  They show 
that policies increasing the levels of public goods provided will generally result in an increase in 
labor supply, and that failing to endogenize the labor/leisure decision generally results in the 
under-provision of public goods.
1  For present macroeconomic concerns, what this means is that 
provision of such goods—even when the initial labor supply is optimal—will result in a supply-
side stimulus to the economy.
2   
  Might the previous argument be of second-order significance?  If we were anywhere near 
the optimal levels of public goods provision, it is possible that any labor supply effects might be 
negligible.  However, since costly benefit -cost analyses are conducted only infrequently, and 
with the true marginal benefits increasing over time for normal public goods, it is unlikely that 
we are near the social optimum for public goods lacking strong special interest support.
3 
  There is a strong additional argument for why it is likely that public goods are generally 
undervalued by conventional benefit-cost methods, and that is that the initial labor supply would 
be unlikely to, in fact, be anywhere near optimal.  As discussed in detail in Graves (2009), initial 
labor supplies are likely to be far from optimal, since  individuals would not be expected to 
generate income for  goods that cannot be individually increased, such as –but not limited to–
certain ―pure‖ public goods.   
                                                           
1 They also show that for decrements to the public good, rare in practice, a benefit-cost analysis would over-value 
the public good. 
2 Flores and Graves’ argument is weakened if public goods are strong complements with leisure, but this would be 
unlikely in general cases.  For certain quasi-public goods, such as recreation areas, some complementarity might be 
expected, however.  I return to fiscal policy implications stemming from whether public goods are complements or 
substitutes for private goods in Section III. 
3 Moreover, for many types of public goods, notably environmental quality, the methods in use by economists are 
biased against acceptance of a policy.  See Graves 2010 for an extensive list of supporting arguments.   The reasoning is straight-forward.  We work to obtain the goods we want to consume.  If 
we are unable to acquire additional amounts of some class of goods by work effort, one of two 
things will happen.  In the absence of good private good substitutes for the public good, work 
effort will not be undertaken because leisure is valuable to everyone.   
  Illustrating, consider an ardent environmentalist, who really cares about saving species, 
increasing wilderness areas, lowering CO2 emissions, and the like but has limited desires for 
ordinary goods.  If rational, she will realize that she is too small to make a difference in the 
collective provision decision; moreover the price she would have to pay to provide those types of 
goods herself is effectively infinite.  She will rationally choose to only generate the income 
necessary to pay for her limited desires for private goods and for whatever amounts of the public 
good  that  happen  to  be  provided.    To  the  economist,  she  is  indistinguishable  from  a  ―lazy 
person‖ who has no strong desires for either private or public goods–and the more that she cares 
for public goods the less income she will generate, in extreme cases ―dropping out‖ like a sixties 
hippie.    Cost-benefit  analyses  of  the  public  goods  that  environmentalists  care  about  will  be 
conducted at the wrong income level and all of ungenerated income would have been spent on 
the public good, ignoring general equilibrium effects.
4 
  We are not all ardent environmentalists, of course, but everyone cares somewhat about 
various public goods—any goods actually that cannot be individually incremented—and to the 
extent that we care about such goods we  have incentives to under-generate income because 
leisure is valuable for everyone.
5 
   
                                                           
4 Were the public good optimally incremented, environmentalists’ marginal values would begin falling as would 
how much leisure they would give up for still higher levels of the public good. 
5 Given the large variation in tastes, human capital, and non-labor income, it is likely that even when public goods 
are substantially underprovided, the provision level will be non-optimally large from the perspective of certain 
individuals.  This would reduce the quantitative importance of the text arguments somewhat.   Is there any evidence to suggesting much real-world importance for the argument that 
certain public goods are under-provided?  Yes, there appears to be a gap between willingness-to-
pay and willingness-to-accept that is particularly large for public goods.
6  The very large gap 
between these measures suggests that the arguments made here could well have merit.   
  If people are asked, for example, what a one percent improvement in air quality is worth 
to them, they will respond with very small values.  But when asked how much they would have 
to be compensated to have air quality become worse by one percent, the numbers are  much 
greater, often orders of magnitude larger.  Many explanations for this phenomenon have been 
advanced, with Daniel Kahneman receiving the Nobel Prize in part for characterizing the WTA-
WTP gap as due to an ―endowment effect.‖
7   
  The arguments here, however, are based on traditional utility theory with ―input market 
free riding‖ that is a variant of the well-known ―output market free riding‖ behavior.  Hence the 
present arguments might appeal to those who want a less ad hoc reason for WTP values that are 
so low relative to WTA values.  Willingness-to-pay is so low, in the present view, because it is 
being  mis-measured,  with  the  ungenerated  income  of  those  desiring  goods  they  cannot 
individually acquire not being observed as demands for public goods provision by economists 
conducting cost-benefit analyses. 
  The arguments of this section indicate that, under normal macroeconomic conditions, 
government expenditure on public goods lacking special interest backing are very likely to have 
positive supply-side multipliers that have not been discussed at all in the economics literature.  
                                                           
6 See Horowitz and McConnell (2002) for evidence from a survey of forty-five experimental studies that the WTA-
WTP gap is particularly large for public goods. 
7 Kahneman et al. (1990) and Twersky and Kahneman (1991) proposed the psychological ―endowment effect,‖ 
Boyce et al. (1992) argue that a sense of moral responsibility might account for the phenomenon, Hanemann (1991) 
examines implications of poor substitution possibilities, and Walton et al.(2002) argue that value uncertainty might 
result in gaps of the type observed.  It is perhaps likely that each explanation is of relevance in particular settings. That is, in terms of a simple production possibility frontier between ordinary goods and public 
goods, increasing the levels of the public good will result in reductions in leisure that shift the 
entire curve outward.
8   
  The public good expenditure multiplier will, then,  not only  be greater than zero, but 
indeed will be unity  if public goods are independent of private goods.  As shown in Graves 
(2009), for the simple case of the Cobb-Douglas utility function in which variable coefficients 
are also expenditure shares , income generated will increase dollar -for-dollar with increased 
public goods provision, with welfare gains up to the optimal provision point.         
III.   Policy Implications When Public and Private Goods Are Complements or Substitutes 
  What are the implications of the arguments here for the multipliers associated with public 
policy in a world of business cycles?  Contrary to the discussion of the previous section, some of 
the under-provided public goods will be complements with private goods while other such goods 
will be substitutes for private goods.  The implications for appropriate public policy in these 
cases are startlingly simple.    
  During times of recession, the government (at  all levels) should be producing public 
goods that are complementary with private goods.  The increases in these public goods will result 
in  more  income  being  generated,  but  now  a  still  larger  income  will  be  generated.    In  part, 
individuals  demanding  public  goods  will  be  generating  income  to  pay  for  what  they  were 
wanting all along as discussed above.  But, it is also the case that as the public good is increased, 
there will now be an increase in the demand for complementary private goods.   
                                                           
8 The outward shift will not be homothetic but will favor the public good if public goods are neither substitutes nor 
complements with private goods.  This follows from the fact that it is only the inability to individually increment the 
public good that is the source of the initial under-supply of labor, an under-supply that is reduced by increased 
public good provision.  With public goods on the horizontal axis, the shift would be parallel to the right under 
independence, with the same amount of private goods being selected before and after increases in the public good.    Examples  are  many,  but  consider  a  few  important  cases.    Roadways  are  clearly 
complementary  with  automobiles—building  new  roads  and  improving  existing  roads  will 
stimulate the demand for automobiles.  One would expect that an environmental cleanup of a 
polluted river would stimulate demand for boats.  Cleaning up a park might result in greater sales 
of picnic baskets and associated goods.  In such cases, the desire to generate income is greater 
than if the public good were unrelated to private goods. 
  For  public  goods  that  are  complementary  with  private  goods,  multipliers  would  be 
expected to exceed 1.0,
9 and this expectation has  nothing to do with traditional Keynesian re-
spending  arguments.    Any  traditional  demand-side  stimulus,  for  those  who  believe  in  this 
possibility, would merely work to increase the magnitude of the multipliers discussed here.  
  In boomtimes, the government, again at all levels, should attempt to focus more on the 
production of public goods that are substitutes for private goods, the notion being to reduce the 
aggregate demand pressures that would otherwise be present.  There are again many examples of 
public goods that are substitutes for private goods.  Increasing levels of public mass transit would 
work  to  reduce  the  demand  for  automobiles.    Providing  greater  public  safety  might  lead  to 
reduced expenditures on door locks, window bars, and handguns.  These sorts of expenditures 
will be less likely to fuel inflation when unemployment levels approach the full employment 
natural rate.   
  In the quite unlikely case that the public good under consideration has perfect private 
good substitutes, the multiplier would be zero or close to that.  Households would generate the 
same income level and merely switch from buying private goods to paying their share of the 
public good.  
                                                           
9  The  text  assertion  that  public  good  multipliers  could  exceed  unity  when  under-supplied  public  goods  are 
complementary with private goods is a result that Barro, although in a Keynesian context, claims  ―would make 
Charles Ponzi proud.‖ IV.   Summary and Conclusions 
  It  should  first  be  emphasized  that  the  arguments  here  do  not  constitute  support  for 
projects that could not pass a properly-conducted benefit-cost test.  However, the arguments here 
do indicate that benefit-cost analyses of many classes of public goods are almost certainly being 
conducted at the wrong income levels at present, with all the ungenerated income representing 
unobserved demands for the public goods. 
  Moreover, public goods are not all equally likely to suffer from insufficient provision 
levels.  Any public good for which strong special interest lobbying exists (e.g. national defense) 
is less likely to be under-provided for reasons long discussed in the public choice literature.  
Moreover, such goods have usually been produced for many decades or even centuries. 
  But other public goods only begin being supplied, directly or indirectly via regulation, 
only after a long period of political pressure (e.g. the environmental movement gradually leading 
up to the creation of the EPA in 1970 in the U.S., with important air and water legislation 
coming  a  bit  later).  Initial  provision  levels  for  such  goods  are  likely  to  conservative,  with 
provision at first well below what a proper-conducted benefit-cost analysis could justify.  This 
pattern, if typical, guarantees that the problem emphasized here of free riding in input markets 
with  consequent  unobserved  demands  will  plague  subsequent  benefit-cost  analyses  for  such 
goods.  
  Summarizing, to the extent that government spending is devoted to public goods that do 
not have powerful special interest support, particularly public goods that appear to have high 
disparities  between  willingness-to-pay  and  willingness-to-accept,  American  households  will 
experience a welfare gain if that spending is increased.  This is true regardless of whether the 
public good is independent, complementary, or a substitute for private goods.     If, however, a public good is independent of private goods one would expect a supply-
side multiplier of about one, a dollar for dollar increase in income with increased public good 
expenditure.  There will be no crowding out of private goods, in this case.  
  Multipliers will be larger than one if public goods are produced that are complementary 
with  private  goods,  and  the  greater  the  degree  of  complementarity  the  larger  will  be  the 
multiplier.  As a consequence, public goods that are complementary with private goods (e.g. 
roads and automobiles) should receive greater emphasis in public policy during recessionary 
periods, since both the public good provision and the concomitant greater demands for private 
goods will serve to stimulate the economy.   
  Multipliers will be smaller than one if public goods are produced that are substitutes for 
private goods, approaching zero in the extreme case of perfect substitutes.  Public goods that are 
substitutes for private goods (e.g. mass transit and automobiles) should receive greater emphasis 
in public policy during boomtimes to reduce the pressure on aggregate demand—what might 
look  like  ―crowding  out‖  in  this  case  merely  stems  from  the  lower  value  that  private  good 
substitutes have when the public good is increased.  
  In more normal years of near-full employment, optimal policy can become much more 
flexible.  Certainly public goods that are independent of private goods and can pass a properly-
conducted benefit-cost test should be pursued—income will grow with neither contractionary nor 
expansionary consequences.  But it is also the case in such years that a mix of public goods, 
some complements with private goods and some substitutes for private goods, could be pursued 
with  a net  impact,  at  least  in  principle,  similar to  that  of providing  public goods  which are 
independent of private goods.    
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